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In a work of philosophy that unearths an unorthodox line of innovation and problem 
construction at the juncture between physics and mathematics, Gilles Châtelet gave 
expression to an intellectual antagonism against the contemporary status that is 
conceded to traditional philosophical and scientific problems. He showed a particular 
uneasiness around what could be called the ''naturalization'' of thought. A most topical 
example of this naturalization is of course the claim of the neurosciences to 
exhaustively explain the power and genesis of thought - artistic, scientific and 
philosophical - on the basis of an extensive knowledge of the nervous system and the 
relationship it entertains to its social and biological milieus. Not mincing his words, and 
in a way that has been noted by at least one scientist of the brain (Alain Berthoz), 
Châtelet mentioned ''the neuronal barbarism which exhausts itself in hunting down the 
recipient of the thought and in confusing learning with a pillaging of informational 
booty.'' Instead, he suggested, the German idealist philosopher ''Schelling perhaps saw 
more clearly: he knew that thought was not always encapsulated within the brain, that 
it could be everywhere ... outside ... in the morning dew''.1  
                                                          
1 Châtelet, Gilles. Figuring Space: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, 14. 
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Fearing neural reductionism, one can go too far in undermining the wonderful 
organ that is the brain. However, in Châtelet's particular take on the tradition of 
Naturphilosophie there is also a prescient resonance for what one could call a resurgent 
metaphysics of non-propositional thought, that reexplores and brings fresh 
provocations to a whole spectrum of relations between the physical, biological and the 
mental, opening to new negotiation supposedly familiar positions like panpsychism, 
organicism and a more recent category like biocentrism. In a tentative generalization, 
one could characterize the nonpropositional as an alternative offered by an updated 
Naturphilosophie against a restricted form of ''naturalization'' in the image of neural 
correlates approaches.  
To be clear, what this useful category - the ''nonpropositional'' - captures are the 
various forms of the extension which makes abstract entities such as truth, method, 
knowledge, understanding, logical processes, criticism, measurement, hypotheses, or 
thought in short, a matter of events and objects whose primarily unthinking and extra-
logical nature is generally considered to be unproblematic: eating, moving, growing, 
acting, metabolisms, rock formations. What is at stake is a massive revision of the 
common dismissal of this second group into mere immediacy, and their subordination 
to the exclusive reflectivity and representational savviness of human thought, when 
thinking is a question.  
That breathing can be an ancestral or nonpropositional form of a logical 
affirmation might perhaps be an intuitive assertion, but it is not necessarily self-
evident.2 A different version of the same claim has found scope in Eugene Thacker's 
analyses of life forms such as extremophiles, organisms that are adapted to survive and 
flourish in extreme conditions and environments (''extreme heat, cold, acidity, pressure, 
radioactivity...''). In a particularly attracting invitation to the problems this study aims 
to lay out, Thacker characterizes these species as ''examples of living contradictions, a 
living instance of the inverse relationship between logic and life'' (Thacker). 
Continuing, we can ask whether thinking happens as much by the formation of metals, 
as through ruminations in symbols within the monopoly of human representational 
thought. Similarly, there may be inborn measurement taking processes which are prior 
to detectors fabricated by human contrivance. Reformulated and given a sharper edge, 
the question may become, how anything can be thought about the ultimate condition 
of any anthropomorphism, before any anthropomorphism exists to assimilate it. As it 
will be seen presently, this is a question to which a renewed understanding of analogy 
                                                          
2 In this context, Jed Rasula draws attention to John Garth Wilkinson's physiology where abstraction is 
traced to human anatomy and “the heart is a self-supplying knot of affirmations'' (Wilkinson qtd. in 
Rasula's Modernism and Poetic Inspiration 199). 
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might not be an altogether irrelevant response.  
While today the ''metaphysics'' which gives some room to these questions has a 
particular prominence, helped among other things by a hospitable trend of media-
archaeological as well as historical interventions that underline the prolongation of 
nature into technology and the abiotic into the human— with resultant revaluations of 
materials in their transmission capacities— it certainly is not so absolutely new that it 
cannot be said to iterate older questions from the philosophical tradition, beside the 
main line of Naturphilosophie that inspires Gilles Châtelet. 
As it often happens, a likely precursor might be Hegel, who, not being satisfied with 
the Kantian ban on knowing things in themselves, set out to expose the knowability 
of—and concurrently the ways of knowing possessed by— what was not immediately 
amenable to human knowledge, by carrying out his manouevres on the limit, 
dislodging seemingly stable and impenetrable object positions in a progressive advance 
by the absolute. With the help of a versatile instrument such as an all-encompassing 
logic of negation, Hegel had no difficulties in attributing a logical valence to an animal 
approaching its food. 
However, the non-propositional that accedes to thought today rarely takes the 
Hegelian trajectory and its human specific dignities, it seems to me, but acknowledged 
or not, follows a line that is closer to Alfred N. Whitehead's desire to mend what he 
diagnosed as the modern ''bifurcation of nature'', according to which the exclusive 
credit given by human subjectivity and mentality to itself about knowledge, thought 
and abstraction is only at the expense of a generally incoherent view of nature at large. 
Foreshadowed by a deservedly influential essay by William James that ushered ''radical 
empiricism'', Whitehead's perspective aims to show that the relation between 
consciousness and the things of the world that one has consciousness of is not as 
straightforward as this bifurcation would lead the moderns to believe, leaving 
unresolved problems like the status of a matter left for dead, and nature reduced to ''a 
dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely the hurrying  of  material, endlessly,  
meaninglessly'';3 and the concomitant difficulty of conceiving how human nature and 
thought may hail from the same dead matter. In a way immediately bearing on the 
context of this paper, his constructions led Whitehead to revise the nature of 
abstractions in particular, taking them not as a prerogative of human thought, but a 
consequence shared by any real material interaction at large, giving it a scope which 
matches that of nonpropositional here: ''Abstraction expresses nature's mode of 
interaction and is not merely mental. When it abstracts, thought is merely conforming 
                                                          
3 Whitehead, Alfred North.  Science and the modern world: Lowell lectures, 1925, 56.  
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to nature—or rather, it is exhibiting itself as an element in nature.''4  
In a more direct way and following from Whitehead's productive engagements with 
romantic views of nature in Wordsworth and Shelley, the nonpropositional in thought 
today is perhaps also nourished by a culture of sympathy with other living things, and 
the earth at large, in the time of their global endangerment by long range 
consequences of human actions. Felt meanings and ''shared sentience'' are gaining 
deeper traction, and claim a space in a more expansive vision of ''rationality'' that 
admits its own blind spots. In that sense a Post-Romantic undercurrent exists in what 
one may call the contemporary investment in the nonpropositional. As it were, the 
assignability of thought, psychism and abstraction outside the human finds a necessary 
accompaniment in a heightened expression of solicitude for others. Therefore it is safe 
to claim that the nonpropositional and its speculative suspension of the rote answers to 
the question about the limits of logos, propositions and even ''psychisms'' do not 
completely rest on an ethically neutral foundation. 
If an increasingly common point of attraction today across debates in 
anthropology, literary criticism, and discourse about the Anthropocene, is the staging 
of a problem similar to the Whiteheadian bifurcation, here the same debate is taken up 
not in terms of the divide between subject and object, and secondary qualities and 
primary, but rather on the level of a difference between propositional and 
representational thought, epitomized by the directed use of language or logic 
undertaken by human subjects, and a nonpropositional thought found in ostensibly 
extrasubjective and extraconsciousness domains like material and organic relations, 
ecosystems, plants, landscapes and non-human liaisons at large, which may presumably 
include functions in the humans as well.  
This is not only about the external world serving as a scaffolding for limited human 
cognitive capacities either. The claims made exceed this type of attribution of 
''epistemic credit'' to environment, an attribution which remains largely limited to a 
field of synchronic assemblies between humans and nonhumans. For a ''migration of 
thought out of the brain'' or a redistribution of credit to happen, the brain must remain 
a central point of reference in a field of simultaneity, however qualified this status may 
be. The temporal status of the nonpropositional on the other hand is to be understood 
not as a limited scaffolding for or coevolution with human thought in a field of 
simultaneity, but as involving precedence and creative supervenience in a field of 
successive phases as well. In other words, the nonpropositional seems to go deeper, 
further back, or laterally farther afield than the adjunct status the ''extended mind'' 
                                                          
4 Whitehead, Alfred North. Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect, 26. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 200 
thesis bestows on the world in its rapport with human cognition. 
This being so, one cannot say that what is at stake is a decentring of propositional 
thought or representation. Seeing in the nonpropositional only a form of antihumanist 
pathos modelled after the antisubjective pathos of yore would not be fair to this 
phenomenon. Since the various accounts that respond to the rift between the 
propositional and the nonpropositional in thought reconfigure the conceptions of each 
respective form of thought, more than a unilateral decentring, a vast recalibration of 
the lingustic in light of the living as well as abiotic materiality, and a recalibration of the 
living in the light of the human languages and logics which arose from it would be a 
more accurate description of the stakes involved. The implications go both ways, and 
open to scrutiny multiple modes of relation between the propositional and the 
nonpropositional: grounding, repetition, amplification, interruption and (re)enaction, 
besides the limited and more familiar mediations that are sublation and representation.  
A nonpropositional scope for thought is often revealed by its claims to defamiliarize 
the criteria of what counts as immanent to thinking, and to critique the limited 
manners of exchange established with what is thereby excluded. As what is often 
excluded out of the domain of propositional thought is diverse, in the following 
metaphysics will not be the only discourse of resort, but will be supplemented by 
interrelated and selective inquiries in poetics, theories of information, the organism, as 
well as ontology proper. In terms of the field to be scanned the inquiry starts with 
poetically non-anthropomorphic formulations of ideation and knowledge to move on 
to the status of the organism and life. The justification of this eclecticism is that there is 
no one mode of breaking the exceptionalisms of propositional thinking; and many 
areas (e.g. the relation between logic and metaphysics, as well as the status of life vis-a-
vis logic) that follow the established contours of propositional-nonpropositional 
distribution would leave behind new opportunities of communication and reshufflings 
after a renewed challenge by the nonpropositional. 
POETIC KNOWLEDGE FROM WALLACE STEVENS' ''NOTES TOWARD A 
SUPREME FICTION'' TO GREGORY BATESON 
Although it is true that certain contemporary philosophical tendencies enjoy a 
particularly noticeable link with the nonhumans and nonpropositional modes of 
thought (speculative realism, actor network theory and so on, to use some handy labels) 
poetry and literature at large have always served as an inspiration for this 
rapprochement. With regard to poetry in particular, here it is difficult not to agree with 
Jean Wahl, who thought that ''if there is a metaphysical base, a hypophysical domain 
[…] if there is a massive torpor at the root of nature and sometimes at our root, it is 
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precisely there that a junction between poetry and metaphysics can be found''.5 If there 
is a massive torpor that is also a ''thought'' at the root of nature and at our root, poetry 
has always been there. Now, a poem that most favorably opens the case for a 
renegotiation between propositional and nonpropositional thought is Wallace Stevens' 
''Notes Toward A Supreme Fiction''. Fortunately it has repercussions for philosophical 
treatments of the questions involved too, witness the attention of Jean Wahl himself, 
from whom I borrow the nomenclature of propositional vs. nonpropositional.6  
Stevens' poem opens up realms that one could call cosmological, and it does this in 
the light of a poetic inquiry into the existence and origin of certain primordial ''ideas'',  
not presupposing beforehand what deserves being called an idea. With an unorthodox 
—not quite Romantic— naturalist inspiration, Stevens' poem draws conclusions from 
the fact that there was a time in the history of the earth, when humans who are able to 
think ideas did not exist as such. Thus, his is a poetic genealogy of thinking, but also by 
implication, a fictional genealogy of matter thinking itself. 
 
Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea 
Of this invention, this invented world, 
The inconceivable idea of the sun. 
 
You must become an ignorant man again 
And see the sun again with an ignorant eye 
And see it clearly in the idea of it. 
 
Never suppose an inventing mind as source 
Of this idea nor for that mind compose 
A voluminous master folded in his fire.7 
 
Starting by referring to ''the inconceivable idea of the sun'' and ruling out ''an 
inventing mind as source'' for it, Stevens's poem has a way of underscoring the 
saliences of objects and matter non-reducible to human thought, from within an 
engagement with this thought. There are materially instantiated ideas in nature which 
precede human ideas and inventions, and which the poem makes a point of 
acknowledging by renouncing a stance of jaded conceptual certainty and knowledge; 
apparently, the inconceivable idea it gestures toward, responds only to a ''perceiving'' of 
                                                          
5 Wahl, Jean Andre,́ Human Existence and Transcendence. 
6 Also cf. Philippe Descola 
7 Stevens, Wallace. The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens. 
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an as yet unspecified nature. Significantly, perhaps it is this renunciation that explains 
why the poem does not pursue the fact that sun as a physical system was a condition of 
possibility for all the minute irregularities and compromises responsible for the shape of 
humanity's existence. A mental flight of the mind which the contemporary 
paleontologist Neil Shubin is so good at making is not quite Stevens' way in this poem: 
''[…]with bodies composed of particles derived from the birth of stellar bodies and 
containing organs shaped by the workings of planets...hard not to see home 
everywhere''.8  
Instead, Stevens' poem turns to its own relation to this ''idea of the sun'' as a poem. 
Whereas Shubin is not talking about an idea when he situates the human in a vast 
domain of cosmologically ancestral conditions, Stevens' poem seems to cling to an 
operation immanent to ideas first, the only way it can turn toward its own limit: ''the 
poem refreshes life so that we share, / for a moment, the first idea […] It satisfies// 
Belief in an immaculate beginning...''.9 The poem and its reflective medium is needed, 
insofar as it reactualizes the beginning through a relation to its own limit, which 
relation serves as a proxy for another relation Stevens invokes: ''life's nonsense pierces 
us with strange relation''. The perceiving to which the poem refers at the beginning 
then, is determinate with regard to its relation to the nascency of life and world.  
The reactualization of the poem is a consequential acknowledgment by the human 
of the preexistent to human life, which is a nonsense for human thought, even while 
this affirmation has its place in the human life and its capacity to make fictions: ''the 
first idea was not our own...there was a muddy centre before we breathed. / There was 
a myth before the myth began, / venerable and articulate and complete'' (Stevens). 
Perhaps, Stevens' poem would not have the same force if it was merely about the 
sublime unthinkability of the preexistent to human; its challenge lies in the way it 
stresses the ambiguous articulation between the myth before myth and myth; 
imagining the necessity of a language and intelligibility that is unhomely, the only key 
of which however, is given by a homelier logic which occludes it at the same time. 
Only by occluding its origins in clouds and sundriven transmutations of the earth, and 
its openness to life's strange relations, can human language affirm these origins, only in 
the  propositional (myth) a sense of the nonpropositional (myth before myth) that must 
have given birth to it, can be conceived.  
In other words, the poem gives a chance to propositional human thought to 
conceive and feel its own improbability, and capture the value immanent to the fact of 
                                                          
8 Shubin, Neil. The Universe Within: A Scientific Adventure.  
9 Stevens, Wallace. The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens. 
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its existence: ''the poem, through candor, brings back a power again//that gives a 
candid kind to everything''.10 As suggested by the unlikely repetition of the poem which 
''brings back a power again'', there is a way the propositional sprang and continues to 
spring from the nonpropositional, only offering meaning by reanimating faint traces of 
this descendance and opening; or it can only reanimate these traces, when it is able to 
engage that limit and improbability at its origin and display that candor, in the relations 
it establishes. The result is a strange reversal: in a sense that leaves no room for idealist 
usurpation, the propositional accedes to its own nonanthropomorphic inclusiveness 
and openness to life's strange relation, while in a nonfinalist sense, the nonpropositional 
starts to entertain a relation to its own determinacies—''venerable and articulate''— 
which must after all have ended up in the supposedly tidier orders and ideas of the 
propositional and human thought in general. 
Stevens talks about a supreme fiction that must have been embedded in the 
generative yet articulate dynamics of the sun, the earth, and weather phenomena as 
''ideas''. Seemingly indifferent, supremely indifferent events before the arrival of human 
ideas and conceptions, setting the ground for these conceptions too, without necessarily 
being for these conceptions' sake. Along the way a generalization of the idea of fiction 
also occurs, shifting from limited human prerogatives to a capacity shared with a host 
of material processes and relations.   
Changing the focus from a broken axis of emergences— myth before myth to 
myth— to this generalizing thrust itself, it is now possible to turn to Jean Wahl's own 
sense of the nonpropositional. Instead of opening up fiction's propositional provenance 
to dispute and corroding wonder, Wahl's own favored target is the idea of knowledge. 
What could be his ''notes toward a supreme knowledge'' are articulated apropos the 
French poet Paul Claudel: ''Knowledge is not for Claudel, something which 
characterizes the human; for him, as it is for diverse contemporary philosophers like 
Alexander, Whitehead, Heidegger, it is necessary to generalize the idea of knowledge. 
A color, ventures Claudel, knows its complementary color. And light knows the eye or 
resembles it […] Thus knowledge is formation and information''.11 
Apart from his characteristically broad and liberal vision of the themes shared 
between the likes of Whitehead and Heidegger, Wahl suggests a comparison between 
the cybernetic ideas of information of his day and the franchise Claudel gives to 
material processes for knowing. To note an important nuance, Wahl's understanding of 
information is not equivalent to a code or message separable from a process of material 
                                                          
10 Ibid. 
11 Wahl,  L'Expeŕience Met́aphysique, 130.  
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formation. Rather, it seems to be a matter of giving credit for ''knowledge'' to material 
phenomena often consigned to being secondary qualities by virtue of their exclusive 
accomodation in human thought. Bypassing the category of cause—often locked in the 
position of a Kantian category giving sense to a deterministic nature— and sidelining 
the primacy of the category of energy, (in)formation suggests itself as a mediation 
between nonpropositional knowing—that of the color's, the light's and the eye's— and 
the propositional one formulable in human signs. In this fashion, Wahl's knowledge 
echoes Stevens' fiction, which restores determinacy and proto-logical order to the 
clouds, the muddy center and the sun, and at the same time a non-idealist and 
nonanthropomorphic expansiveness to human fictions. 
Commenting further, Wahl writes ''Knowledge is the registration of the real 
rapports existing between things...Knowledge, it's the fact of completing oneself in 
extension: the sea knows the ship; the axe and oak both know the rock; the fire the 
food which it cooks, the metal which it smelts [...] we are within a universal relation 
where each thing knows the other''.12 Needless to say, Wahl's example of a fire knowing 
the food is far removed from the presupposition of a knowing in the image of a 
representing consciousness, witness the allusion placed in the well-chosen word, 
''extension'', lifted from its Cartesian provenance and repurposed. Extension after all, 
even when taken in a Cartesian sense, is fully material. Wahl's generalization of 
knowledge rather seems to have its basis on the selective grasp between mutually 
sensitive materials and processes: it is not the relatively indifferent coupling of fire and 
rock which is the exemplary pairing of this expansive vision of knowledge, but pairings 
like fire and food as well as the sea and ship, with their consequential couplings. 
If material forms and acts of reciprocal information offer one strategy in the 
conceptualization of a knowledge that includes the nonpropositional, another strategy 
for Wahl seems to be the category of vibration. In his further reflections on Claudel, 
the philosopher presents the medium of the universal relation between things as a 
''community of movement'', gesturing toward a vision of a vast vibrational milieu after 
the poet's own proclivities. As Claudel himself speculates, ''it (vibration) is the very 
'element,' the radical symbol that is the essential constituent of all life. The vibration of 
our brain is the bubbling of life's wellspring, the emotion of matter in contact with 
divine unity, whose ascendancy constitutes our very personality''.13 With a Catholic 
inspiration which informs this vision of a continuum between the material and the 
neurological, Claudel seems to envision the nonpropositional and propositional 
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
13 Claudel, Knowing the East, 98. 
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uniting, fanning out and differing as modes of vibration, which is like a proto-
knowledge. However, this shifts the criterion of generalization from selective grasps 
and formational impacts to a scale and ubiquity indifferent to them: basing the 
communication between human and nonhuman forms of knowledge on vibration, 
rather than selective impact and sensitization, requires a different type of constraint. 
Here the sense of a more inclusive vibrational constraint, the constraint of a tactile 
flickering, grounds knowledge as well as propositional thought, resulting in a 
resurrected alchemy which gives matter credit for thinking.  
To point out the main difference between the two distinct attempts at 
nonpropositional thought made in these passages, the first one seems to expand 
insights which seem to have an unacknowledged technical inspiration to domains 
outside technicity, whereas the second one courts a greater degree of generality thanks 
to the omnipresence of  vibration as a natural phenomenon: On the one hand the 
constraint of selective impact, on the other the more generic constraint of vibration. 
Overall, Wahl's examples from Claudel, like Stevens' poem, are significant for the 
space they allow to relations and compositions maintained by strictly abiotic existents. 
Moreover, in each case poetry emerges as a privileged domain of discourse for the 
avowal of a sense of continuum, thanks to the ''strange relation'' that opens when the 
propositional is not taken as its own source and principle but treated in its relation to 
antecedent and underpinning forms of nonpropositional interaction. 
However, a question seemingly left in suspension by these two works, Stevens' as 
well as Claudel's, is whether there is an analogy at play which grounds the two forms of 
approach to the nonpropositional, fictional and epistemic; and if the thinkability of 
what is normally resistant to human thought is ensured through a procedure like 
analogy familiar to logical thought, what may be the best characterization of such an 
analogy. Is it importing certain definite relations instanced in a given a domain—say a 
meteorology—to serve as a model for the relations in another, teasing method from 
matter, through another but occluded method? While this would mean that the poets 
and the authors involved are not postulating an unaccountable mystical union which 
embeds the propositional mind in nature and the natural tendencies of growth in the 
mind, by leaving analogy unacknowledged, one would risk taking it as a reified form of 
logical procedure without exploring the metaphysical conditions or baggage which it 
may bring. As Gregory Bateson seems to have believed, the conditions and manners of 
knowing, and by implication the nature of analogy, is not indifferent to the discoveries 
about nature at large : ''From the manner of the search, we can read what sort of 
discovery the searcher may thereby reach [...] what is my answer to the question of the 
nature of knowing? I surrender to the belief that my knowing is a small part of a wider 
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integrated knowing that knits the entire biosphere or creation''.14  
ORGANIC THOUGHT 
There needs to be a further advancement on the blandly generic affirmation that 
human thought belongs to a nature which antecedes and holds the conditions for its 
creative emergence. The rest of this partial survey will rely on three headings, 
responding respectively to the question of the organism, the status of semiotics and 
finally the contributions of traditional ontological questions to the configuration of the 
nonpropositional. After questions about the physical order at large, plied with the 
resources of poesis and fabulation about antecedent conditions of an ancestral phusis, 
now the question comes to the specificity of the organic, or the possibility of 
considering the organism itself as the locus of an inborn manner of knowing or 
abstraction at large. Strangely enough, defending the claim of the organism to a 
legitimate manner of abstraction, poses no less substantial difficulties. The association 
of bodily functions with an opaque or immediate form of existence, or an ''in-itself '' 
without the capacity of reflection, is entrenched, and one might suggest, rightfully so, 
considering the largely nonconscious and involuntary character of the operations 
involved. As it were, the organism poses a particular challenge to the nonpropositional 
extension of thought through its very proximity and heightened contrast with formal 
abstraction, as well as a human language fatefully understood as a superaddition to 
bare life. 
From another angle, the brain is a part of the organism, and one that receives 
exclusive credit for a wide range of abstractions, formal and otherwise. Nevertheless, 
stopping at affirming the belonging of the brain --as the ''seat'' of thought and 
language-- to the organism would make for a weak sense of nonpropositional thinking 
that would only reiterate the Cartesian division between thought and extension.15 To 
be exact, it would bring the risk of thinking the jointure between life and thought as 
something receptive to ''privative'' analyses, situating propositional thought once again 
as the index of human exception and superiority to other forms of life.16 At best, the 
conception of the brain as the appointed and sovereign locus of thought, refuses to see 
a problem in the possibility of a nonpropositional thought. What is required is a 
conception of the body as a complex arrangement comprehending functions of 
nonneural denomination; in other words, to carry speculation toward the possibility of 
a ''logos'' that would shift the partitions between the neural center and functions often 
                                                          
14 Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. 86-88. 
15 Cf. Elizabeth Wilson; and Giovanna Colombetti's  The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind. 
16 See for instance, David Farrel Krell, Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life 
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called ''peripheral''. 
With response to the problem delineated in this fashion, the possibility contained in 
the term ''organology'' may suggest itself as a tentative solution, if it is taken to refer to 
an organ or organic function not only as an object, but as the source of a certain 
intelligibility and intelligence. There are organic stabilizations in being that have to do 
with parsing different individuals—as in the immune system— making distinctions, 
communicating among each other, and in certain instances going ''wrong''. In this 
sense, the organological and its primacy over the neural-nonneural hierarchy may hold 
a certain key to conceiving a nonpropositional tailored for the organism. The 
organological gambit in this sense also brings home the fact that the identification of a 
nonpropositional thought often requires and makes itself known by a certain 
defamiliarization of the traditional understanding of thought. 
Elizabeth Wilson has recently made a version of this move of defamiliarization in 
her exploration of a possible thought carried out by the organism itself, within the 
context of what she calls a ''gut feminism''.17 In her discussion of what she calls 
''hysterical materialization''18  implying a clinical dimension of organology--where the 
clinical corresponds to a context where norms are up for grabs-- Wilson makes an 
inroad to a nonpropositional form of thought. In a reading of Sandor Ferenczi's 
unconventional perspective on bodily symptoms of hysteria, which takes them to be 
shifting somatic embodiments with a logic and psychism of their own abreast with a 
phylogenetic unconscious, she seems to find a possibility of generalization: ''The 
thinking that an organism enacts when its cognitive, rational, symbolizing structures 
have been destroyed should provide an opportunity to reconsider the nature of 
thinking in the usual sense. […] The vicissitudes of ingestion and vomiting are complex 
thinking enacted organically: bingeing and purging are the substrata themselves 
attempting to question, solve, control, calculate, protect, and destroy''.19  
Drawing implications, the consequences of the defamiliarizing extension that is the 
nonpropositional are very clear here. Here one is not only negating a disembodied 
perspective that fits a caricaturally banal, but partially truthful version of Descartes; 
not only the restrictive identification of thinking with cognitive problem solving is 
questioned, it is also suggested that what the organs like the throat and the stomach 
can do for us and on their own, may be forms of thinking as legitimate as step by step 
cognitive questioning, and problem solving: ''organic thought''.  
While this gesture involving a clinical embodiment of organological speculation 
                                                          
17 Wilson, Elizabeth A. Gut Feminism. 
18 Ibid., 56. 
19 Ibid., 63. 
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may not be sufficient to accommodate human propositional thought and 
nonpropositional organic thought as kinds along a veritable continuum, it at least offers 
an alternative to more traditional bifurcations between the cognitive and the living. For 
one thing, the organism finds itself entangled in certain necessary negotiations that 
determine the interface between life as a condition of human logic and ''logic'' as a 
latecomer on the ground of life's strange relations. This is an interface where pathology 
and anomaly meet truth, and a form of ''muddy'' or non-propositional judgment may 
be expressed in a body's sympathies and antipathies. Put otherwise, it may be possible 
to make a stronger claim for a nonpropositional thinking evident in the organism, 
based on this new and defamiliarized sense of thinking. Compared to the unilateral 
association of thinking and cognition with the unproblematic neural capacities of the 
organism, this certainly registers an advance toward a problem of the nonpropositional. 
Most notably, here it is possible to find a departure for conceiving the relation 
between the nonpropositionally organic and propositional human thought on a mode 
other than superaddition and sublation. When one establishes this relation as one that 
connects abstraction to abstraction, rather than an impoverished concretion to the 
richness of signification, it simultaneously becomes more difficult to commit to a 
subtractive conception of life deduced from an image of the already propositional 
human thought. To be concise, the organological marks a theoretical moment or sense 
of a relation between life and thought that is not equivalent to the one between 
prelogical and logical. 
SEMIOTICS AND LIFE 
If one route of introducing a nonpropositional thought in the organic is the 
organological, as exemplified by Wilson's understanding of hysterical materializations, 
another passes through a thought of semiosis as an expansive activity. It could be said 
that these two routes have a shared reliance-- implicit or explicit--on a model of 
amplification or relay of intelligence. Thus, the organological gambit of amplification, 
or the status of the organism as a domain of nonpropositional logics also trails along 
the possibility of a more extensive conception of semiosis, insofar as it may testify to a 
thought beyond the human.  
Concomitantly, the next moment of the rapprochement and all round recalibration 
pursued in this essay is a consideration of semiosis or symbolic activity at large. For a 
strategically informative case, one may consult the work of the anthropologist Eduardo 
Kohn. In agreement with the direction of semiotic study called ''biosemiotics'', Kohn 
brings to his anthropological work a semiotic approach that radically qualifies the 
exceptional status of the human with regard to the reading and production of signs, or 
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their employment in general. For him ''all life is semiotic and all semiosis is alive''.20 In 
this conviction Kohn is partly inspired by Charles Sanders Peirce's highly versatile 
generic scheme of ''representation'', which conceals implications for non-humans as 
well. Kohn writes, ''representation is something both more general and more widely 
distributed than human language'', thereby recasting the usual role given to this term. 
What this essay means by the nonpropositional then corresponds to Kohn's 
unorthodox—guided by Peirce— use of the term ''representation'', whereas the 
propositional is human language and the specific symbol making capacities it involves.  
A foundational move for Kohn's intervention is one that is familiar now thanks to 
the previous discussion of Wilson on organism, which is a defamiliarization of what is 
usually understood by semiotic competence: ''The challenge is to defamiliarize the 
arbitrary sign whose peculiar properties are so natural to us because they seem to 
pervade everything that is in any way human and anything else about which humans 
can hope to know''.21 Echoing the strange relations coming to expression in Stevens' 
poetry, Kohn bases his approach on his ethnographic field work with Runa people and 
their specific relations to the forest where they dwell, noting how ''these relations 
amplify certain properties of the world, and this amplification can infect and affect our 
thinking about the world''.22    
If the arbitary sign as the prerogative of the human is defamiliarized, admitting to a 
deep complicity with morphologies and expressions found in an ecosystem at large 
(whether plant or animal), Kohn seems to think, then one gains a foothold to adress 
''what signs look like beyond the human'', thereby also scrambling the usual 
coordinates of the assignability of thought. To Kohn's credit he does not follow the long 
lasting and widespread reflex of responding to this problem with some narrative of 
human superiority and overcoming of immediacy, managing to avoid introducing hasty 
hierarchies and intimations of unilinear complexification. The problem is re-thinking 
the relations of precedence along with the tangly and messy coexistence between 
semiosis as such and human semiosis, without resorting to these familiar narratives.  
Like Wallace Stevens, Kohn does not believe in an absolute separation between 
human thought and the sign beyond the human. Instead, he conceives the relation as 
an ''amplification'', implying both prolongation and qualitative/novelty-introducing 
change, without assuming the ''supersession'' of the nonhuman thought in human 
thought. Kohn puts the point thus: ''Are we forever trapped inside our linguistically 
and culturally mediated ways of thinking? My answer is no: a more complete 
                                                          
20 Kohn, Eduardo. How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology Beyond the Human.  
21 Ibid., 42. 
22 Ibid., 94. 
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understanding of representation, which can account for the ways in which that 
exceptionally human kind of semiosis grows out of and is constantly in interplay with 
other kinds of more widely distributed representational modalities, can show us a more 
productive and analytically robust way out of this persistent dualism''.23  
Kohn's semiotic approach is undoubtedly exciting and constitutes a vital 
provocation to thinking the belonging of human sign competence to a speculatively 
vaster realm of expression. In a great example of this extension, Kohn discusses the 
elongated snout of an anteater —thus a morphological characteristic— as a sign: ''a 
giant anteater is a sign, what it is—its particular configuration, the fact, for example, 
that it has an elongated, as opposed to some other shape of snout—cannot be 
understood without considering what it is about, namely, the relevant environment that 
it increasingly comes to fit through the dynamic I've just described''.24 Nevertheless, 
here a certain question seems to emerge, concerning whether a semiotic framework 
may become a necessary and informative addition to the traditional description of the 
snout, which would be a language of evolution and organogenesis. Specifically, the 
question would concern the nature of the relation between adaptation and semiotic 
surrogacy (whether this relation would be a complementarity or hierarchy, for 
instance). By dint of offering a reinscription of functional adaptation, Kohn's account 
would perhaps find a particular challenge in the status of the human brain with its 
superimposed levels of functional adaptive ''signs'' and willingly deployed propositional 
signs in human language.  
Similarly, one cannot but think that in the general reconfiguration of the relation 
between human symbolization (the propositional) and representation at large (the 
nonpropositional), there always remains an asymmetry, leaving one side less open to 
manifestation. The achievements of human thought in clarity can be pushed back 
toward a muddy center more easily than the venerable and articulate nature of the 
inhuman can be demonstrated, if not felt. When it comes to insisting on the proximity 
of human thought to ''the muddy center'', it is possible to find some consensus: 
''Language does not so much attempt to (and fail to attempt to) capture life but rather 
enacts it, for us humans, in a certain way''.25 In comparison with this inscription of 
language in terms of life, the reverse scenario is always more difficult: when life as such 
is to be reinscribed in terms of semiosis and logic, it creates some natural resistance that 
human logic cannot create for life, as it is, unambiguously, life. In this sense, the 
concept of amplification works with only a certain partial validity, by which 
                                                          
23 Ibid., 41. 
24 Ibid., 76. 
25 Zylinska, Minimal Ethics for the Anthropocene.  
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amplification is necessarily judged from the point of view of the already ''amplified'' 
human order with access to codified symbolization. It may be that the limit to 
conceiving a nonpropositional thought is not only the effective limit of the longstanding 
primacy of the propositional, but a certain tact as to what is truly not to be thought, 
and worth preserving as the non-signifying. 
ONTOLOGY BETWEEN THE UNIVOCAL AND THE ANALOGICAL  
In the scope of this essay so far, traditional questions of being, becoming as well as the 
relation between being and nothingness have only found implicit and passing 
deployment as possible inroads into a thinking of the nonpropositional. This section 
aims to remedy that, by returning in effect to the Pre-Socratic problem of the co-
belonging of phusis, logos and being as well as extending it in the direction of the more 
specific question of analogy. The main problem here is a reconsideration of the  
benefits of certain ambiguous cognitive structures or tendencies to structuration, in 
dramatizing the propositional itself in its emergence out of the nonpropositional. 
Among these tendencies, pattern generation and analogy will furnish immediate 
examples here; in other words these forms of thought serve as occasions for a reprise of 
the statement of Whitehead mentioned above, according to which ''when it abstracts, 
thought is merely conforming to nature''. 
Heidegger's work is rightfully known as the most significant modern renewal of 
traditional ontological problems, yet for the purposes of this essay, his work is also 
hampered by a perspective that is centered on the Dasein and its privileged relation to 
what he variously treats as ''unconcealment'' and ''world disclosure''. The question of 
the living along with its scientific thematization have a singularly labored status in 
Heidegger's work, thanks to his conspicuous and not always successful insistence in 
subordinating these to the primacy of a framework provided by ''Being'', however 
radical it may ultimately be. It would not be wrong to claim that, thanks to a centring 
on Dasein, there are structural limits to Heidegger's discourse which make it waver 
between human exceptionality—without humanism—and various sporadic advances 
toward a less anthropocentric eventality. Therefore his work here is relevant mainly for 
its shortcomings in living up to an affirmation of the kind Merleau-Ponty on his part 
felt compelled to make, and defines the stance of this paper as well:  ''An ontology that 
avoids mentioning nature shuts itself away in the incorporeal and, for this very reason, 
offers a fantastical image of mankind, of the mind, of history''26 
However, the very same obstinacy at work in Heidegger's writings works in ways 
                                                          
26 Merleau-Ponty qtd. in Châtelet, 102. 
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that may help clearing a place for nonpropositional mode of thought. This is the case 
when Heidegger acknowledges a place for analogy in thinking the difference and co-
belonging of logos and being. In his Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger presented a 
characteristic etymological apercu on the nondiscursive provenance of logos, and by 
implication analogy: ''[…] logos does not originally mean discourse, saying. What the 
word means has no immediate relation to language''.27 Instead, he suggested, the more 
original meaning was something along the lines of ''interrelation'', ''relationship'' or 
more resonantly, a ''gathering''. Therefore, Heidegger treated analogy as a rare case of 
a splicing between the nonpropositional and the propositional: ''In the expression 
'analogy' (correspondence) we even find both meanings side by side: the original 
meaning of logos as 'interrelation' or 'relationship' and its meaning as 'language' or 
'discourse'''28 
Thus, in a way that has been anticipated before, analogy may have a key role to 
play in ontology's own treatment of the differences and relays between the 
propositional and the nonpropositional. Analogy here spreads the folds of being, 
creating zones of continuum between human thinking and processes of vital or 
material genesis. In a very precise sense, analogy absorbs the (onto)logical properties of 
what can otherwise well be called univocity, if this word really implies the following: 
''being pure saying and pure event univocity brings in contact the inner surface of 
language... with the outer surface of Being...''.29 More properly, univocity intends the 
ontological univalence which makes all that exists exist in the same ''sense'', whether 
they be a god or a leaf. In the following I hope to offer an elaboration of Deleuze's 
statement that is not necessarily very faithful to its context in his discourse, where it is 
articulated with a thought of a transcendental embodied in topological models. 
Particularly, my intention is benefiting from the idea of univocity in situating the 
analogical as a form of thought that allows the nonpropositional to come forward (in 
the sense a being comes forward) in the recursions of human propositional thought; in 
correlation, analogy is to be treated more under the aspect of an act rather than a 
representation.  
Underpinning the recursive emergence of nonpropositional within the domain of 
human thinking is a postulate that necessarily relies on the idea of ''phylogenesis'' and 
its associated time scale.30 The role of nature –which Merleau-Ponty designates as a 
                                                          
27 Heidegger, Martin, Introduction to Metaphysics, 131. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 180. With some license here the medieval terminological distinction and 
contrast between analogy and univocity is thus relativized and disregarded to some extent. 
30 Phylogenesis has an important place in Wilson's previously discussed foray into an ''organic thought''. 
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mandate for ontological thought-- is played not least by phylogenesis, involving the 
scheme of a lineage and scale of generation not amenable to direct conscious 
experience or propositional conceptualization. As Fernand Deligny wrote in a different 
context, ''as far as the human is concerned, species memory, under the grip of symbolic 
domestication, is unexplored, and apparently unexplorable. It was ages ago that 
language cut to the quick of the common itself, at the beginning of time, or almost''.31 
In this light, the task becomes the cultivation of a sensitivity to the coexistence and  
reciprocal determination between different temporalities: on the one hand 
propositional language with its undeniable step-by-step logical excellences and powers 
of transfer, on the other hand, more ancient attunements to correlations, patterns, 
concretions and analogies with a broader psychic basis; on the one hand the challenges 
phylogenetic time poses to intuition and on the other the very different challenges 
found in the temporalities of pattern recognition, as well as the nascencies involved in 
the real time of actual analogies. Without austerity, and yet without unscrutinized 
immediacy, a sense of formal genesis may go a long way and may be a real chance of 
transfigured survival for the Parmenidean unity of being and thought.32 
Certainly, categories of nascency and genesis have a long history, especially in their 
various intersections with the differently coded relation between finite and infinite; one 
that includes and goes further back than earlier Romantic equivalencies between 
thought structures like imagination and nature. Particularly, one may associate this 
emphasis on the possibility of an experience of the nonpropositional as an experience 
of phylogenesis with a register often designated as meontological, in the sense of the 
valorization of nothingness, unfinishedness and absence as productive principles in 
their own right. A certain merit of a meontological resurgence in this sense, ranging 
from ideas of human anthropological unfinishedness to affirmative visions of 
permanent neurological immaturity, is that whatever opening to outside it affords to 
thought, it is never on the level of substance but rather in terms of the modest but 
precise level of a schema of relations. An ontology abreast with the juncture between 
ontogenetic thought processes and vast phylogenetic conditionings needs to 
incorporate a meontological dynamism. This condition brings me to the final stage of 
this extended inquiry, which is a discussion of Leo Bersani's recent foray into 
cosmology and phylogenesis entitled ''Far Out''.  
In this essay, Bersani establishes what he calls ''correspondences'' between processes 
of heterogeneous scale like cosmological generation, the trajectory of human 
                                                          
31 Deligny, Fernand. The Arachnean and Other Texts, 222. 
32 For Parmenidean unity's notable restatements see Deleuze and Guattari's What is Philosophy?, Gilbert 
Simondon's L'individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information, and Michael Marder's Grafts.  
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phylogenesis and finally the self-referential level of an analogical thought operation. In 
other words, his reflections have a parallel claim on that zone of complementarity 
between metaphysics and logic, if analogy is taken to be the legitimate logical 
procedure which it is. For Bersani, the establishment of a new tie between 
propositional human thought and nonpropositional existence has a very pointed 
temporal form: if analogy keeps alive the trace of the nonpropositional in the 
propositional, it does this because it enlivens a ''memory'' akin to a species memory. 
Bersani has more in common with Elizabeth Wilson in this regard, whose engagement 
with Ferenczi's unorthodox speculations also makes some emphasis on the presently 
felt phylogenetic traces shaping contemporary psychic economies.  
Naturally, one of the most striking aspects of these connections is the way analogy 
is singled out as a privileged delegate for the nonpropositional in the field of 
propositional human thought, bringing to mind Bateson's earlier specifications around 
''method''. For Bersani, analogy simultaneously puts into play two different but 
obscurely interrelated scales of temporality, spanning at once a present ''in the making'' 
and the deep past of cosmology. The nascent and unfinished process of making 
analogies takes on a potentially cosmological import, putting implicit emphasis on a 
different sense of negativity: ''It is as if we were at the moment of similitudes just 
emerging—unfinished, unrealized''.33 There is a way the negative is reconfigured to 
invest a process of material generation not from the side of a subsequent idealist 
standpoint, but from the side of whatever being found in statu nascendi. It refers to a 
state of being unfinished and ''toward'' without the finality of a state of arrival. 
Bersani's provocative assertions about analogy in thought and being are outlined 
against such a background of assumptions.  Departing from the physicist Lawrence 
Krauss's statement that ''every atom in your body was once inside a star that 
exploded''34 and his accompanying bid to replace Christian myth with science, Bersani 
makes a series of vertical and vertiginous connections, linked step by step with each 
other: 
To engage in this activity of positing uncertain alikeness is to expand the field of 
being. The relational is no longer constrained by the perhaps always illusory 
certitudes of similarity. In the specific case we have been looking at, the oddity 
lies not only in the unprovable yet possible status of a widespread religious myth 
as deriving from mnemonic traces of our cosmic origins, but also, and perhaps 
even more significantly, in the mental move that makes the connection (however 
                                                          
33 Bersani, Thoughts and Things, 81. 
34 A closely related version of which we encountered in a previously quoted statement by Neil Shubin. 
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lightly and in passing). The cosmological theory establishes our derivation from 
stellar atoms, while the analogy between a savior’s death and the death of 
unimaginably ancient stars suggests the ease with which the human mind can, 
both in scientific theory and religious fable, articulate its affinity with the 
nonhuman. This affinity reverses Cartesian dogma: res cogitans corresponds 
ontologically with res extensa. Our connective field extends far beyond and 
before the human. We can think like matter, or perhaps more accurately, matter 
thinks us. To use like in this way invites a reformulation that dispenses with it. 
Alikeness is absorbed into a congruence, or community, of being.35 
Through a complex series of communicating intermediaries, Bersani seems to be 
suggesting that nonhuman matter and its incommensurable temporal scales can 
nevertheless take the form of a far-flung analogy in terms of human thinking. The 
charged separation and plurality of matter, finds a congruence with the charged 
separations and pluralities of analogy. In a way that recalls Stevens' poem moreover, 
this is a vision of an ancestral and nonpropositional absolute coming to manifestation 
thanks to the mediating capacity of the spontaneity of poetic human analogies. Bersani 
invites us to consider analogy as the space of a relation beyond relation, where matter 
juts into and finds convoluted expression in human thought. 
———— 
 
Thanks to its multiple tributaries in a new vision of organicism, ontology and semiotics 
the survey has reached a point where the bifurcation of the propositional and 
nonpropositional have been traversed from both directions: whereas loci like the 
organs, the muddy center of the sun, vibration as well as an anteater snout have been 
discussed in their capacities of articulacy, human thought itself has been caught out in 
the elusive avowals of  its ''far out'' kinship with stellar matter and transformations of 
the species. 
Especially in the second direction, analogy has played a determining role. Being a 
part of propositional human thought, analogy has also turned out to avow a sense and 
''oddity'' that makes no sense for human propositional thought: that part in analogy 
which is like a jutting of ancestral cosmic matter. However, a host of other expressive 
categories may be equally suitable to carry out similar adjustments between the 
propositional and the nonpropositional. Some of these also enjoy a specific  proximity 
to poetic thought: mimesis, rhythm and gesture perhaps await their own eulogies for 
''far out'' negotiation. 
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One thing the essay has not considered is the information paradigm which 
similarly establishes a rapprochement between human languages and codes, and not-
fully-human or nonpropositional structures like genes. In fact there is an influential 
lineage in biology and cybernetics for which the ''book of life'' still constitutes an 
illustrative trope, thereby offering a deceptive parallel with the objective of this survey. 
For the reason of the anthropocentric and humanist underpinning of this trope 
however, which inevitably glamorizes the human decoding capacities, it has not been 
brought into the ambit of this discussion, which tried at least to take the nonreducibility 
of life and the nonpropositional more seriously. 
These ideas have the merits of defamiliarizing human thought and checking the 
hubris attending any sense of the exceptional nature of human thinking, by showing it 
to be impregnated with the nonhuman. Moreover, differently from other theoretical 
evocations of a thinkable nonreducible to human thought, such as the one that is 
offered by Quentin Meillassoux's speculative realism, or Eugene Thacker's 
rehabilitations of mysticism, most of the examples discussed here allow a greater scope 
for a relation beyond relation which brings the nonhuman into the aesthetic presence 
of the human, without resorting to negating supersession, nor anthropomorphism. In 
fact, especially with respect to Meillassoux, instead of singling out the austerity of 
mathematical formalization as the only means of thought to register the traces of its 
obscurely and incommensurably ancestral conditions, the examples give a greater 
weight to poetry and the aesthetic at large. 
On the other hand however, there are also some insurmountable problems in 
completing the intuition of the community of the propositional and the 
nonpropositional. First the necessity to preserve what is inassimilable to 
anthropomorphism, and next a wariness concerning a logic of resemblance insinuating 
itself to analogies dedicated to indexing a nonhuman thought, persistently create 
problems for envisioning a thought beyond the human. Relation can only be 
established beyond the relation, in the incompleteness of the intuition. 
 
In fact, one wonders whether —given a single-minded will to pursue the 
nonpropositional and carry it to its extreme conclusion— one may end up with a 
situation where abstract entities like truth and knowledge may get so much 
''naturalized'' that nature ridden with so many ideas may need renaturalization in the 
image of an unthinking and mute obtuseness, a back and forth swing that may also 
include a re-idealization of ideas. At least, a necessary conclusion of these arguments is 
a sense that one cannot endlessly relativize the distinction between the propositional 
human thought and the physics of thinking inherent in the nonpropositional without 
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simultaneously occluding the invention that human propositional thought constitutes. 
Finally, perhaps one of the most significant faultlines that can inform this attempt 
comes from a fact that is very commonplace, and thus a bit alien to the grand 
cosmological scale that stamped the last part. Thinking has a special relation with 
difficulty. One does not have to reach back to Heidegger to know that feeling of not 
having thought until, one fine day, an entire system of presuppositions is turned on its 
head, and one really starts ''thinking''. If it behooves one to take this experience 
seriously, which has troubled not a few people from Antonin Artaud to Scott Fitzgerald 
to Gilles Deleuze, another significant rift appears: the human is not exceptional for the 
way it can take credit for being able to think, but it may be exceptional for the way it 
cannot take credit for being able to think. But one never knows about rocks and roots, 
if one believes Isabelle Stengers, channelling Whitehead: ''but what do you understand 
about rocks or roots, little man?''.36 
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